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DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND AGGREGATION OF DEMAND 
Francisco Marhuenda 
ABSTRACT 
We show that, under certain regularity conditions, if the distribution of income 
IS price independent and satisfies a condition on the shape of its graph, then total 
market demand, F(p), is monotone, i.e., given two positive prices p, and q, one has 
(p - q) . (F(p) - F(q)) < O. Similar assumptions on the distributions of endowments, 
yield a restricted monotonicity property on aggregate excess demand, where, now, wealth 
is determined by market prices. This is enough, however, to obtain uniqueness and 
stability of equilibrium for our Walrasian pure exchange model. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
A satisfactory theory lillkillg the kllOWll microecollomic features of consumers and 
the assumed macroecollomic properties of aggregated systems is still missing. The major 
stumblillg block to filI the gap between these two fields, is how to find a way around 
Sonnenscheill's indeterminéLcy theorem. Sonnenschein's ([15, 16, 17]) result states that 
ally continuolls, mapping that satisfies Walras' law and is homogeneous of degree O, 
coincides with the excess demalld function of a certain economy. 
This has some unpleasant consequences. One of these, is that it permits the 
theoretical possibility of many equilibria. Furthermore, it questions the regularity (in 
terms of smoothlless, like differentiability) of market demand and the stability of the 
equilibrium prices. 
The problem of smoothness of market demand was satisfactorily attacked in [4]. 
The authors there show that convelliently dispersed distributions of preferences and 
wealth lead to a continuous 01' even el demand function. The interested reader is 
referred to [18] for a survey on market demand in large economies with non-convex 
preferences and for instaures in which aggregation has a smoothiug effect. 
Two main lines of research have dealt with the remaining issues. i.e. umqueness 
and stability uf equilibriulll prices. One of them was initiated by W. Hildenbrand ([9]) 
and developed by W. Hardle. W. Hildenbrand and M. Jerison in [8]. The gist of their 
method is to put restrictious uu the shapc of the distribution of income. The upshot 
of this approach is that one obtains that market demand is monotone (see Section 
below). In particular, this implies that market demand for a particular commodity is a 
decreasing function of its priee. ami that the weak axiom of revealed preference holds 
for the aggregatt>. 
However, the restrictions imposed are rather stringent: Firstly, income is price 
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·independent. Moreover, it is assllllled that the dis,tribution of income has a continuous 
. . 
non-increasing density with bOUllded support. 
With respect to the first assumption, it has been extended to the case in which 
individual endowments are collinear ([9],[1:3]). In [1], the second assumption has been 
relaxed, to other types of densities for the case of identical consumers the Engel curves 
of whom have a specific functional formo 
A second line uf argument has beell put forth by .1. M. Grandmont ([5]). His 
approach is to impose rest.rictiolls on the ,<;hapt: 01 t/tr agents' chamcteristics rather than 
on the distributioll 01' income. In his work the use of a very particular linear structure 
on the space of demand functions, named the a-transform, is essential. 
As a result the author proves very nice properties of the aggregate demand: market 
demalld has a dominant diagonal .Jacobian matrix and aggregate excess demand has the 
gross substituability property. It follows then that there is a unique equilibrium which 
is globally stable under the usual tatonnement process. 
There are still some unsatisfactory features in the aforementioned viewpoint: One 
of them is that the way the a-transform is used does not have a straightforward eco-
nomics illterpretation. 
Further, the so-ca11ed hypothesis of agg1"f'.gatc dcsirability which also appears in 
a critical way, in the said \\'ol"k, is not sa.tisfied hy Illally 01' the wOl"king examples of 
demand models (e.g. CES, Diewert 01" Addilog). Even though one could argue that 
it rnay not be met individualIy and yet hold in the aggregate, it certainly puts sorne 
constraints on the type of demalld functiolls allowed. 
The present work goes back to the first formulatioll. The key idea is again to 
control the "pathologies" of the illcome term in Slutskyls e<luation 
DF(p) = 8(p) - A(p), 
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where DF is the .Jacobia:n inatl'ix uf mean demand, S' ·is the ave~age Sluts~y cornpensated 
. . 
matrix and A is the average inconw matl'ix. We do this by way of conditions in the 
shape of eithel' illcome 01' initial endowments. 
The novelty is twofold: First, in the case of price independent wealth, we allow 
for sorne increasing densities while the Law of Demand still holds for all prices. In 
particular, our result applies to some subfamily of lognormal distributions. 
Secondly. for the case of pUl'e mal'ket exchange economies, we obtain uniqueness of 
price equilibrium all(llocal stability fol' the unique equilibrium, when initial endowrnents 
need not be necessarily collineal'. 
If one imposes a further restriction on individual demand functions, then it lS 
possible to obtain global stability of the unique equilibrium. 
Dne further characteristic of our present work, already present in [5], is that the 
rnatrix A does not need to be positive semidefinite, i.e. it may have some negative 
eigenvalues. "Ve do make use however of the hypothesis that S is negative sernidefinite. 
The papel' is organized as follows. In Section 2, we study the problern of aggrega-
tion demand for a model in which income is indepelldent of prices. We introduce the 
notion of metonymy, which was airead)' present in the work of W. Hardle. W. Hilden-
brand and 1\L .Jerison ([8]) alld is also essential in the present one. 
We pro\'e that if the the shape of tlw density of the distribution of income satisfies 
a certain restriction, the Law of Demand holds fol' all prices. 
Essentially the same pl'oof shows that it is possible to obtaill the monotonicity 
of market demand fOf all prices by imposing that the second eigellvalue of the Slutsky 
compellsated tel'm be stl'ictly negative <1..-; l)l'ices go to the boulldary of the positive 
orthant, rOl' at least one agellt iu t,he enmomy. This is a conditioll on consurners' 
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preferences. It is satisfied, for example. if tlwre i~ at least one C()'ll~umer: w.ith a CES 
utility function. 
In Section :3 \Ve apply these ideas to the setting in which income is determined by 
the market price of initial endowments. The Law of Demand cannot hold in this case. 
However, a limited version of it can be shown, and this restricted variation is enough 
to yield uniqueness. By strengthenillg the assumptions, the weak axiom of revealed 
preference in the aggregate follows. 
These properties 01' total Illal'ket dt'IlHI,lld haVt' éL countel'part in the stability of the 
model un del' a "Walrasian auctioneer" mechanisl11. 
This research \Vas mostly conduded during a stay at the U. of Bielefeld. Thanks 
are due to the Illstitut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung for their hospitality. I 
am especially grateful to W. Trockel who introduced me into this interesting subject. 
Without his help and advice this research would not have beell possible. 
Support from my colleagues at the Ulliversity of Alicante is also gratefully ac-
knowledged. Particularly, f)'om C. Herrero and L. Corchón, fo)' advice and discussions. 
One of the early drafts benefited, as welI, f)'OIll conversations with some of the partic-
ipants at the Bonn Workshop 92. 1 am glad to acknowledge very helpful suggestions 
from J. M. Grandmont éLnd M .. Jerison. 
In order to facilitatf' the reading all the proofs are relegated to the Appendix. The 
reader is referred tht'n~ also for au f'XplalléLtioll of the llotation llsed through out this 
work. 
2 MARKET DEMAND 
We consider an economy with n goods ami éL colltinuum of agellts. Consumers will be 
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distinguished frOlll each other by their preferences ami incm;n~, which. for the moment 
, . . 
wiII be assum'ed' to be exogeneously given. Typically, the chai'acteristics of each age~t 
in the economy will be determined by his individual demand function and income. 
Definition 2.1 An individual df1nand fundíon is a (¡l mapping f : R~+ x ~ -t R~, 
satisfying the foll01lling propc1'tic:s: 
(i) Budget ídentity: p' f(p, w) = tu; 
(ii) Wcak Axiom of Rf'vralf'd Pn'/frC1/,Cf: for fvcry (p,'w) and (p',w') in R~+ x~, 
p' . f(p, 'lo) :S w' implif's 1)' .f(,/. w') ~ w. 
Here p E IR.~+ denotes the vector of prices and w E ~ is the consumer's budget. 
It follows frolll this defillition that individual dellland functions are homogeneous of 
degree O in (p, w). We note that dellland fUllctions for consumers are defined only for 
prices in the interior of the positive orthant. 
It is al so a well known fact that the axiolll of revealed preference as stated aboye 
implies that the Slutsky substitution lllatrix, S(p, lO), with entries given by, 
af¡ af¡ 
'S¡i = ~ + -;:} fi 
vPi vW 
(2.1 ) 
is negative selllidefinite, i.e. for every :1: E 1Rn, < 8(1',10):1:, x >$ O. The rank of the 
SIutsky lllatrix can be at most 11. - l. sinc<~ 8(p, lO) . P = O. 
Definition 2.2 A n indi'"idual df11/.aJul fundion i..;; ¡;(lid lo bf 1'(qular if it is continuously 
differentiablt: fo1' p E IR.~+ and fo'/' t""f1'Y (p, w) E IR.~+ x 114, the Slutsky matriz S(p, w) 
is symmdric. 
Apart from differentiability of the demand functions, f(p, w), the other cooditioos 
can be derived if one assumes they at'ise from cOlltinuous, strictly convex alld oon-
saturated preferellce relations. 
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We will assume that the .hehavior of e~ch consumer is described by a. demand 
functioll as in the above definition (which may be taken as the solution to the usual 
individual utility maximization problem) and an income level. Here we assume income 
to be exogenously given and independent of prices. The general case, with income 
depending on prices wiJI be studied in the next Section. 
A market economy, say E, is a triple, ((A,IL),{f(a,·,·)}oE.A,W), where (A,J.') is 
a Borel space, f(a,·,·) is an individual demand fUllction, and, for each p E R~+, the 
functioll f(',p,w(')), defined un A, is contilluous ami integrable, i.e., f(·,p,w(·)) E 
V(A) n C(A). The mapping w : A --+ [{+, which is also integrable alld continuous, 
represents the illcome leve! of each consumero Thus, ror each O' E A, the relevant 
economic features of consumer O' are captured by f(a,',') and w(a). We shall also 
assume the measure J.' to he atomless and regular, assigning strictly positive measure to 
open su bsets of A. 
In this contexto at a given price system p, total demand is defined by 
F(l') = L f( 0',]>, w( 0') )d,L. (2.2) 
We assume that this integral is fillite, F(p), is differentiable and, furthermore, for 
p in the interior of the positive orthant we have, 
aF af 
-a· (1') = { -:;-(a,p,w(a))d,L < oo. 
1'j J.A (/1'j (2.3) 
We sha11 enote by DF(1') the .Jacobian Illatrix of F at p. 
Definition 2.3 An fC01LOmy E i~ st,itl lo be: n:!/,ulal' if 2.:1 holds tmd for all a E A, the 
mappillg f(a,·,·) is a 1'fgula7' de:mand flludion. 
The Lau7 of Dcmalld is said to hold for the economy E. ir total demand F(,J) is monotone, 
i.e. if for each p, q E R~+, with JI =F q, 
(1' - q)' (F(p) - F(q)) < O. (2.4) 
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The Law of Demand is easily obtained if it holds for each individual Q at aH 
budgets. This is the case~ for exalúple, if individual demand functions ~re derived 
from homothetic preferences. Another instance in which the Law of Demand has been 
obtained, [9], is for economies with identical consumers and a decreasing density of 
income. These results havt> been extended in [1] to a.n economy with identical consumers 
in which the Engel curves can be writtell as L~=o 9k(p )<Pk( w) and the functions <Pk( w) 
satisfy certain restrictions. Economies with agents not necessarily identical have been 
studied in [10], agaill ullder the assumption of a decreasing density of income. 
These may however be collsidered to be very restrictive cases. Furthermore, they 
do not seem to apply easily to tht> case of income dependent on prices, unless aH endow-
ments are collinear. In this Section \Ve wiU be con cerned with other situations in which 
the Law of Demand holds. 
RecaH now the 
Lernrna 2.4 Let G be a cont' of In-iccs. TIH: follo'Wing conditions arr equivalent 
(i) Thf Jacobian matl-ix DF(p) is Ilfgatillf semidrji.nite fOl' each p E G. 
(ii) For all pl'ÍCCS p, q E G, (p - q). (F(p) - F(q)) :5 o. 
The proof is similar to the usual case (see [12]), so we will omit it here. It is also a well 
known fact that the negative definiteness of D F(¡)) implies the strict lllonotonicity of 
total demand, F(p). We note, that the converse is not trut'. 
For w E 1R+, define B(w) = {n E A : w(n) = w}. That is, B(w) is the set of 
consumers whose wealth is exactly w. The measure l' induces conditional distributions 
r¡w on B(w), for each w ami a probability measure. v on lf4 such that for any function 
h E Ll(A,dl')~ 
f lul,L = f (f hd7/.u )dll. lA lH+ 18 (111) 
11 
Definition 2.5' ([8]) The: mcaSU1'C JL is said to bc mc~o1Lymic if: 
(i) The measure v has an absolutdy contintLOUS dcnsity, p, with support contained in 
(ii) For cach z E lRll , 
r (r .:~) U' Z) 2d17w)P(w)dw = r .)Ü (r U· z)2d17w)P(w)dw lR+ lB(w) (¡W lR+ (. W lB(w) 
Condition (ii) in the aboye definition is fulfilled if the conditional distributions 17w do 
not depend on w. This is the case if (A, JL) = (C x D, 17 (8) v) is a product space, 
in which (C,17) describes the distribution of types of consumers and (D,v) describes 
the distribution of wealth. Thus, the simplest case in which metonymy holds is if the 
distribution of types is the same at all income levels. This is not a necessary condition 
though, and it is also valid in many other instances. We refer the reader to [8] and [10] 
for a more detailed discussion of metonymy. Nevertheless, we remark that condition (ii) 
is equivalent to: 
for all i,j, 
Fix now a E A, p E lRn , p > O éLnd cOllsider the quadratic form defined on sn-l, 
11 
S(n,71,;z;) = L .';¡¡j(n,71)]Ji]1jX¡Xj. 
i,j=l 
(2.5) 
This function is eOlltinuous in aH the arguments for p E lR~+ ~ From the properties of 
the compensated demand fundion, it follo\Vs tll<Lt this fOI'l11 is llegative semidefinite. In 
fact, for Xo = 7,d1. ... , 1), \Ve have 8(0,1',;1:0) = O. The eigellvalues of S(a,p,x) have 
the form, 
(2.6) 
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We define 
and 
'x(n) =. sup '\2(0,]1) ~ O. 
pEH++ 
,X = L 'x(a)dll· 
Assume that ,X < O. Define also 
w= jw(a)dll E IR.+. 
Consider now the folluwing quantity 
(2:1) 
(2.8) 
where, if 11'0 denotes the orthogollal projectioll onto the plane {z : XO' z = O}, then ~ is 
given by 
~ = inf{1I1I'o(x)1I 2 : 1I;z:1I = 1. x· ;z:o? O. w IIx - xoll? 3 }. 
f1,2(2w + 1) 
By means uf the qualltity E we can make precise the stateinellt that by imposing 
certaill restrictiollS on the shape of the densi ty p( w) the Law of Demand for a range of 
prices is obtained. 
Theorem 2.6 Lct E = (A,Jt), {f(a,·, ·)}oE.A,W) be a markct economy and suppose the 
following hoid: 
(i) The Ecol/.omy t: is 1'eguiar. 
(ii) T]u~ mftls'/t1'C Jt is mctonymic. 
(iii) ,,\( a) < O on a 8ct of positi'l1e mcaStt1'f. 
Let ! be dcjinfd by :1.8. If 
1 2' 'W p(w)clw < é, {w:P'(tu»O} (2.9) 
then the LaUl of Dcmand holds f01' all prices p, q E IR~+, unth p :f:. q. 
'Remark .2.7 The number e appearmg 111 Expression 2.8 depends on the de~sity p 
through integration. As stated, Theorem 2.6 gives only a sufficient condition (whic,h has 
to be checked in each particular case) for the Law of Demand to hold. 
With further hypotheses it is possible to obtaill a positiVf~ number e which depends 
only on the set of consumers, A alld their demand functions but not on the possible 
densities p, for which the measure JL is metonymic. Namely, suppose 
Ao = sup{A(O') : O' E A} < O, 
and 
""'o = inf{w(O') : O' E A} > O 
hold. Then Theorem 2.6 is still valid for 
e = mill{~, IAolh"} > O, (2.10) 
with 
6 = inf{lIl1'o(x)1I 2 : IIxll = 1, x· ;z:o 2:: 0, Il x - x II > Wo } o - ni(2Wo + 1) . 
If this is the case, for a fixed set of COllsumers, A, with regular demand functions f(a,·,·), 
in the sen se of Theurem 2.6, it is possible to COllstruct metollymic measures JL, which 
are not alUlay,<¡ dCC1"ra,<;iug and for which the Law of Demand hold5. 
Example 2.8 We present next au example of a fUllction, p(t), which gives all idea of 
what killd of distributiollS we may expect theon'm :Ul to apply to. 
The density distriblltioll is pien'wist' linear as given in Figure 1. It attains its peak 
at the poillt too Suppose \Ve require tlmt tIJe total population with income less than to 
be a < 1, and assume that, for that sector, the distribution p is given by p(t) = ato A 
simple computation shows that given e as in Theorem 2.6, we may take to = ~:' a = ~ 
and tbis distribution satisfies J{p'>O} t 2p'(t)dt $ c. 
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p(t) 
to t 
Figure 1: 
Example 2.9 It is possible to extelld the aboye result to llllimodal distributions. Namely, 
let p( w) be a ullimodal distribution, which attaillS its peak at the point to E R. Let 
M = sup{p'(w) : w E [O, to]}. 
A simple calculatioll is therefore required to show that cOllditioll 2.9 in Theorem 2.6 is 
'fied 'f Mt& ven 1 3 < é. 
Example 2.10 Fillally. \Ve apply Example 2.9 to the case of the lognormal distribution: 
p(:r) = _1_'!'exp(_ (lll:r: ~ 1,)2). 
uJ2; x 2u'}. 
"Ve find that this distributioll attaills its p~ak at the poillt to = é'_(12 and condition 2.9 
in 2.6 is satisfied for 
_(12 
.F 2 ~ 
-.-ll+lt+u --.1<.: 
uJ2; u 2 
Remark 2.11 To compare the above result with the existing literature ([9],[10)) we note 
that we are assuming hel'e additiollal regularity cOllditiollS, llamely, that all demand 
functiolls be differelltiable. alld preferellces be strictly COllvex alld llon-saturated. In 
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contrasto we obtaiu the La.w of Demand for a. certain,type of not necessarily, decreasing 
density distributions of income, without ma.king strong assumptions on the Engel curves 
as in [1]. 
As noted by M .. Jerison, it is not really llecessary in Theorell1 2.6 that f( a, p, w) 
be continuous in the first argull1ent. 1 t suffices to assUll1e that f( o, p, w( o)) is integrable 
as a function of the variable o. 
In contrast, the next result does l1lükt> use of this hypothesis and it follows from 
Theorem 2.6 by taking into consideration tlw fact that >'( C\') is a continuous function of 
a. 
Theorem 2.12 8uppose the folloUling hold: 
(i) Thc Economy E is regula?". 
(ii) The. me.asurc l' is mdonymic. 
(iii) There is ao E A, surll that >.(ao) < O. 
Then there is é > O such that if 
{ w'lp'(w)dw < é, 
J{tu:p'(w»O} 
thc Lall' of Demand holds /01' all p"iccs ]J. IJ E IR.~+. 
'Ve llotice that Condition (iii), is a limitation on the consull1er's individual pref-
erences rather than one on dispersion. However, it is enough that it be satisfied for 
one consumero Because, by continuity of >.(0), it is then verified for a set of consumers 
of positive measure. It is easily verified rOl' CES utilitiy functions. Hence Condition 
(iii) is fulfilled as long as tht>rt> is om' agent in the economy with CES-type preferences. 
Remark 2.7 applies also here. 
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3 . MARKET EXCHANQE.ECONO·MIES 
We now apply the ideas in the preceding section to a competitive pure exchange econorny. 
Thus, each trader's inr.ome is now given by the market value of his own endowrnent and 
is. therefore, price dependent. 
In this new context, a market exchange economy will be a triple 
( (A, l' ), {f ( 0', " . ) } (tEA, w). 
The only difference with the previous Section is that w E Ll (A, IR~) n C(A, R~), now 
represents initial endowments. ratlwr thall income. In other words. we suppose that 
each consumer (\' E A has an (~lHloW111ellt w(O') E IR.~. 
We let 
w = L w(a)dp. 
denote the mean endowment. Total demand is defined by 
F(]J) = L f(a,]J,]J . w(a))dp., (3.11) 
and the market. excess demand fundion is then 
Z(p) = F(p) - w. (3.12) 
As before, we assume Z(p) to be a el function and suppose that one may differentiate 
with respect to p under the integral signo 
It 1S imllH>diately St'en tha.t Z(p) is homogeneous 01' degree O. bounded below by 
;;., and satisfies Walras' law: JI' Z(p) = O. A positive price ll" E IR.~+ will be called an 
equilibrium prin> if Z(p*) = O. 
We now introduce the concept of metollymy in this setting. For.c; E R~ we let 
G(s) be the set of agellts in the economy whose iuitial eudowmellt is s, i.e. 
G(.s) = {O' E A: w(a) = .c;}. 
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The measure l' induces a conditional distributioll, say 17s on each 9(8) '~IQng with a 
measure v on 1R~, such that if h E L 1 (A, 1R.~), thell 
1 hdp. = f (f hd17s )dll , .A in ... iG(s) 
Recall that the Slutsky equation now reads, 
afí , 8f¡ 
-a (cr,p,p' w(cr)) = "¡jl(o,p,p.w(o)) + (Wj(cr) - h):¡I(n,p,p.w(Q))' 
~ ~ 
Definition 3.1 lile: say that the:/1I.fa8Urf JL zs m.cionym.ic if the: folloUJing conditions 
hold: 
(i) The mea.. ... ure I1 has an absolutcly continuous dcnsity, denoted by g( s), supporled 
. ]Rn 
m +. 
(ii) Por k = 1, ... , n, for all y E IR.tI and for all priccs p, 
Note that if \Ve assume that the measure JL is a product-type measure of the form 
l' = 71 x v, as in the precedillg Sectioll, thell part (ii) follows from part (i). Namely, 
(A, p.) = (C x D, 71®v), where, now (C, 17) describes the "types" of consumers alld (D, v) 
the allocation of initial endowments among each type. As in the price-indepelldellt case, 
it is easy to verify that condition (ii) is t'quivalent to the following one 
for all i,j, k 
Our conditiollS 011 the shape of the distributio11 of initi,Ll endowments will be 
expressed by requirt'ments un the derivatives 01" lhe density g(8). Considero 
B+ - {, JI"{tI. iJg( .. ~) O} k - .sEu+, ü· > . 
·'lk 
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We will make use of tbe following rpsult, 
Given a vector e E IR~ denote by H (t:) = {;l: E IR" : J: . e = O}. The following is a 
variant of lemma 6.1 in [1:3], 
Lernrna 3.2 ([13]) Lct F : IR~ -t IRfl be. a el jiLnction, H a conc contained in 1R~+ 
and e any vcctor in IR~. Then the folloUling arf cquilJalcnt: 
(i) For C'Vf1'Y p E H the Jacobia1/. l/la17'Í;¡; DF(p) i.<; negativf scmidcfinite on H(e). 
(ii) (p - q). (F(p) - F(q)) ::; O fOl' C1Jcry p,e¡ E H Ulith P =1= q and p' e = q' e. 
We can now state a restricted version of tbe Law of Demand. This will be enough, 
though, to guarantee lIniqlleness and will also provide stability of equilibrium in a closed 
cone of prices. 
In order to exhibit the ftexibility oí our methods, we will consider now a slightly 
different variant of hypothesis (iii) in Theorem 2.6. Namely, we suppose that, for all 
consumers, the rallk oí the Slutsky nmtrix is the maximum it may have, i.e. we assume 
its rank is exactly n-l. In this case, the eigenvalues of S( Q, p, x) givell by 2.5, now 
have the formo 
(3.13) 
Consider a dosed cone oí prices H e 1R~+. We Jet llOW 
(3.14) 
• '1.J n L'11-1 . t L'k' I f' slllce n .:1+ IS compac. 1 '(~\Vlse. \Ve «~ lIW 
,,\ = L"\( (\' )cl¡t 
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.~nd 
Consider é defined by 
v = inf p' w. 
pE8~-1 
E = IAlv > O, 
nllwlh 
where for z E R'\ 1j=lh = Lk=l 1=lk' We have, 
Proposition 3.3 JI the lollowing hold: 
(i) The Economy i.~ regular. 
(ii) The measurf J1. is melonymic. 
(iii) For every consumer, the Slut.r;ky matrix has rank n-l. 
(3.15) 
Let 'Ji e R~+ be a closed cone 01 priCfs. Lel E > O be dejil1ed by Equatio71 3.15. JI for 
all k = 1, ... ,n 
1, 11 11 2 iJg(.<;) l· < :-+.5 ;:1 (.s _ .... , Bk USk (3.16) 
then the excess demand ¡Ilndion satisjies, 
(p - q). (Z(p) - Z(q)) < O (3.17) 
for all price.'1 p, q E 'H. with l' =f q and 11' W = q . w. 
Remark 3.4 The prool' 01' Pl'Opositioll :3.:J shows that collditiol1 (iii) in it can be replaced 
by the following one: 
( i i i) A ( (\') < O on a .<;C.t o f lJositi'/1e meastu'('. 
Remark 3.5 The numbel' é appearillg in Proposition :l.a is computed usil1g data ob-
tailled from the Slutsky IllCLtl'ix of all l~OnSUll)(~I·S. Hence, equatioll :3.16 restricts the 
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shape of the graph of lhe .density dfstribution of income ac,o~ding to. the consumers' 
. . 
taste. 
As observed in Remark 2.7, the qualltity E depends, in principie on the density p. 
It is also easy to verify from the pl"oof of PropositioB :3.:3 that if 
AO = sup{A(o) : o E A} < O, 
and 
Wo = inf{w(o) : o E A} > O, 
then the Proposition holds for 
which does Bot depend 011 p. 
IAolv 
E = nllwolh 
Remark 3.6 \Ve observe ([1:3]), that :3.17 cannot hold fOl" all prices. Indeed, let p E 
R:+ such that Z(p) ~ R:. There is q E R~+ such that q·Z(p) < O. For A E R consider 
(Ap - q)(Z(Ap) - Z(q)) - Ap(Z(Ap) - Z(q)) - q' (Z(Ap) - Z(q)) 
= Ap(Z(p) - Z(q» - q' Z(p). 
For small enough A the last term can be made positive. 
However. \Ve can still use this result to show that if the distribution of initial 
endowments is consistent with :3.16, then there is él. unique equilibrium. Let aR:+ 
denote the boundary of 1R~+, i.e. iJ1R~+ = {p ~ O: for some O :::; i :::; n, Pi = O}. 
Theorem 3.7 A.ssumr Ihr follo"llliu!/ hold: 
(i) Thc Economy is 1'rgttla1'. 
(ii) The mr.astu'C J.I. is mcto1LymÍt~. 
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(iv) For every C07Lsumer, the Slutsky matrix has mnk n-l. 
Then therc is e > O such that if for all J.: = 1, ... , n 
h 1111 :/}f/(·5)¡. -<; --( o.; <. Bt·· ().sk· - '-, 
there. is a uniquf fq'llilib1'ÚL'In price, p •. 
Furtherm01'c, thC1'C is closcd couc of p1'iCfS H e lR~+, containing p., such that for 
all q E H, which is not collinca1' mith p., mc have that p • . Z(q) > O (thc weak axiom of 
revealed preference for the aggregate holds in H). 
We are restricted to a closed cune to guarantee to ourselves that the substitution 
effect is boullded away from O for at least one consumero Thus, assumillg this, we can 
dispose of the con e H. Recall the definition of -\( n) given in :3.1:3. 
Theorem 3.8 Let thc following hold: 
(i) The Economy '¡s 1'(q1tla1'. 
(ii) Thc mca..5m'c JL is melonymic. 
(iii) If {Pn}n e lR~+ COnt1ergcs to l' E alR~+, filen 
(iv) There. is no E A, such tilat -\( nu) < O. 
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Then therc is e > O such that if f01' all ~ = 1, ... , n 
1 2Dg(s) + 11.0;11 ~d.o; ::; e, Bk U·'lk 
the1'e is a uniquc equilib1'ium ¡n'ice, p.. Furthe1'm01'e, f01' all q E lR~+, not collinear with 
p., toe hatJc that p • . Z(q) > O (the weak axiom of revealed prefcrence for the aggregate). 
4 STABILITY AND A TATONNEMENT 
PROCESS 
In this Section we suggest a pricp adjustment process which, for the economies consid-
ered, converges to the unique pquilihrium. COllsider the standard tatonnement process 
p(t) = Z(p(t)), (4.18) 
where p = * i.e. prices move in the direction of excess demando 
It is a standard result that if the weak axiom of reve.aled preference as stated in 
Theorem :3.8 holds the the aggregate, thell the unique equilibrium price is a globally 
stable equilibriull1 point of the system of differential equations 4.18. Thus we can state, 
Proposition 4.1 If the following hold: 
(i) The Economy is reguLm'. 
(ii) The mensure JL is mcfonymú·. 
(iii) There is (\'0 E A, .,,;uch lhal. A(nu) < O. 
Tllen thf.7'C is e > O Buril that if f01' all k = 1, ..• , n 
h 11 1128g(s) 1 -.'1 (: S < e, + Ü -BI; . ·'1k 
the uniquc .equilibrium p1'icc gitJfn m Thc01'C1n .. 1.8 is asymptotically stable un.der the 
tátonnement 4.18. 
5 FINAL REMARKS 
We have presented a model of apure e.xehange eeonomie system in which total market 
demand is monotone in priees. This allows ane to obtain results on uniqueness and 
stability of the equilibriull1 priet:'o 
The aim of our work has been to do this through as realistic hypotheses as possible 
on the distribution of total expenditure and, at the same time, without imposing too 
restrictive conditions on cOllsumers' preferences. We WillllOW compare our results with 
the existing literature. 
With respect to the line followed in [9], [la] and [1], the novelty here is that we 
allow for some illcreasing densities of income without making assumptions on the Engel 
curves.Our methods can be further extended to the more general setting in wich wealth 
is determined by the market price of illitial endowments. 
The alternative approach to the problem of aggregation of demand. followed in 
[5], makes rather strong assumptions on both, the consumers preferellces (aggregate 
desirability) and the distribution of 'c.hamcteristics' (the conditional densities in each 
class of o:-transfOl'm are all the same, and aH tlw agents in that dass have equal wealth). 
In return, the author obta.ius tha.t oue does not lleed to make any reference to individual 
rationality other than homogeneity a.ml Walras' law. 
hl the near future, it is hoped that empirica.l estimates will be obtained in order 
to test wbether the observable distriblltions sa.tisfy the hypotheses proposed here. It is 
also hoped that these findings will be extended so as to inc.orporate productioll, and a 
temporal framework. 
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APPENDIX 
Let S~-l denote the positive orthant of the ullit sphere, S~-l = {x E R++ : l/xII = 
1}, where n is the llumber of commodities. 
We will use the followillg rOllvelltiollal llotatioll: R~ = {z E R
' 
: z ~ O, z :f:. O} 
1R~+ = {z E R
' 
: Z¡ > O for all i = 1, ... , [}. Similarly, we denote the usual inner 
product in R 71 by < ;r, y >= ;['.y. We will need the following norms in R 71 : I/zl/ = ..jL¡ Z[ 
and IIzllt = L¡ Iz;!' The inequality 11=111 '$ JñIl=1I is a standard resulto 
We will also make use of the following, 
Lernrna 1 Lr.t 9 E C1(R'" R). Lft G bE: a convex liubsr.t 01 R 7I and let a, bE G with 
g(a) = O. Suppose lor all x E G, and i = 1, ... , n, 11 ~II < Q. Thcn 
Proof of lernrna 1: 
Let h(t) = g(bt + (1 - t)a). Clearly, h(O) = g(a) = O. h(l) = g(b), so 
1& 
< <l' L IIb¡ - adl 
i=1 
o 
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Proof of Theorem 2.6: . 
From the remark following lemina 2.4 we only haw to show that the .Jacobian matrix 
DF(p) is negative definite. By the Slutsky equation, for each a E A, 
af¡ Df¡ 
OPi (a, p, t) = ,sij( a, p, t) - Ji al l(o,p,I). 
Let y E R 7I and define 
8(p, y) (A.2) 
A(p,y) (A.3) 
Thus, F(p) is monotone if and ollly if for all prices p E lR~+ alld y E lR7I , fi(p, y) < 
A(p, y). We will show this indirectly. 
Let p E R~+ ami a E A. Define 
and the matrices, 
S(a,p) - {st(a,p)}ij 
A ( a, p) - { arj ( a, p)} jj. 
We consider now the qUéLdratic forms, 
S(p, J:) 
-
-
A(p,x) 
-
-
S(O', p, :c) 
-
-
L < 8(a, p):c, x > ([IJ. (AA) 
t f ,'1jj(a'¡J,w(a))x¡:ciPilJidIL 
i,j=) lA i < A(a, 7)):1:, x > dlJ. (A.5) 
JI () 1,. L ¡ h(a,p,w(a)) ;:ll(o,p,w(a));L"¡;CiP¡PidIL 
i,j=1 A vt 
< 8(a,p)x,x > (A.6) 
JI L ,'1ij(a, P, w( a))PiPiXiXj. 
¡,i=1 
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. We tlrst note that the t~leorem foll?ws ir ~e can. sl~ow that foro aH p E R~+ 4Ild 
. ... ' .. 
x E lRn , S(p, x) - A(p,:1:) < ° , where S and A are given by equations AA and A.5. 
Because, given y E IRII , Jet ;1:i = .lYi, then 
P • 
. S'(p,y) - A(p,y) = 8(p,x) - A(p,x) < O. 
It is also enough to prove that S(p,x) - A(p,x) < ° for x E 8 n - 1 = {x E Ir' : IIxll = l}. 
For then, ir z E lRn \ {O}, there is 7' = IIzll =1= ° such that x = ~z E sn-1, and 
S(p,z) - A(p,z) = 7· 2(S(p,:z;) - A(p,x)) < O. 
Since the eigenvaJues uf S'( 0,]J,;1:) in A.G are giwn in Equatioll 2.6, we see that there 
is an orthonormaJ transformatioll M E O(n), taking Xo = *(1, ... ,1) to (1,0, ... ,0) 
and such that MS(a.,p)M- I is the diagonalmatrix 
(
O O ... O) 
~ A2 ~: ~ O 
° An 
Let A(a) = sup{A2(a,p) : P E IR.~+} ::; O. Let y = Mx and denote by 7r and 7ro, 
the orthogonal pl'Ojections onto the planes {z : Z1 = O}, alld {z : xo·z = O}, respectively. 
Note that M o 7ro = 7r o M. For each (a,p) E A x R~+, we have, 
L ,si,í(a.,p,w(n))pipí:CiXí = < S(a,p)x,x > 
¡,í 
= < 5'M-Iy, M-Iy > 
= < MSM-Iy,y > 
= 
2 2 A2(n, P)Y2 + ... + An(a,p)Yn 
::; 2 2 A2(a,p)(Y2 + ... + y,J 
< 2 2 A(a)(Y2 + '" + y,J 
= A(a) < 7r(Y), 7r(Y) > 
= A(n) < 7r(M:c),7r(M:z;) > 
= A(a) < M7ro(:c), M7ro(;z;) > 
= A(O) < 7ro(x),7ro(x) > . (A.7) 
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Let 
A = L A(a)dJl. 
Since A(a) ~ O and "(a) < O on a set of positive measure, we have that A < O By 
integrating, we have that, 
(A.S) 
We let 
h = inf{lI7l"u(:z:)1I 2 : IIxll = 1, .z:. ;co ~ O, w IIx - xoll ~ 3 } 
n 2 (2W + 1) 
and define é > O by 
e = min{~, IAI8} > O, (A.9) 
where 
w = J w(a)dIL. 
Thus, for all p E 1R~+ if IIx - xoll? .1 W_ ,lIxll = 1, and x· Xo ? O then S(p, x) < -é. 
n~(2"'+l) 
Suppose now that p satisfies fp'>o t 2 pi < é. 
We study first the term A(1),:C). We have that 
71 , iJj¡ 
A(p,:l:) = 2: {jj ,Jtl<",I',..,(o));l:¡XiP¡PidJl 
i,i=l lA (. 
aj¡ 
- L (2: h:Z:jPi)(2;, Ot l(o'I',..,(o))x¡p¡)dJl 
J t 
1 ¡ ü (2:' )2 
- - - j'x'1)' d'L :2 A üt . J J 3 r 
J 
11 i (J2:' 2 - -:- ( 7'( j'X'P') dr¡dp(t)(lt. :2 ~ G(t) dt j J J J 
In particular, we have that A(p, :ro) = ~. 
Siilce the measure l' is metonymic, twic(-! the last term in A.lO eqllals 
(A.IO) 
By i.~ltegrating by parts this i~ the same as, 
-1 f C2:..ljXj]Jj)2dTlIP'(t)dt, 
R+ 1G(I) j 
which can be decomposed into, 
(A.U) 
Now note that in case lI;c - :coll < ~;;¡, , we must have that A(p, x) > 0, because, 
11 ~(2w+l) 
from Equation A.ll, fOl" i = 1, ... , n, 
IOA I < OXi 
- 2w+2e 
< 2w + 1, 
where we have used that 
~ 
-
= 
-
-
L W(O)dJL 
1 ¡ td711P(Lt 
R+ G(I) 1 tp(t)dt 
f4 
-~ 1 t 2p'(t)dt > O. 
2 R+ 
(A.12) 
Equatioll A.12 holds also fOl" ;1: in the open unit hall (\Ve need this in order to apply 
Lemma 1). Thus. ir A(]J,.t) = O, thell, by L(~Il1J11a 1, 
A(p, xo) = w < (2w + l)y'ñllxo - xII. 
n 
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So, Ilxo - xii> f W • 
. n (2w+l) 
w Hence, we may assume that 1I;z: - xoll > ¡ The integral over the region 
n!(2w+l) 
{t : p'(t) :::; O} appearing in A.II is positive and will cause no problems. Thus we will 
concentrate on the region {t : p'( t) > O}. 
Fix a price p E lR~+ ami define 
= ~ f f (2: l¡x¡p¡)2d77Ip'(t)dt 
2 J{I:pl(!»O) JG(!) i 
1j l" 2' = -:- (L.-I¡XiPi) d7JIP (t)dt. 2 {1:pl(I)$O} (;(1) i 
Note, that A-(p,x) ? O. The theorem will follow if we can show that IA+(p,x)1 < 
IS(p,x)l, for appropriate x. Sillce the quadratic forms 8 and A+ satisfy S(p, -x) -
S(p, x) and A+(p, -.z:) = A+(p,:z:) it is enough to show that S(p, x) + A+(p, x) < O for 
x in the half sphere Sg-I = {= E 8 n - 1 : :1:0' = ? O}. Thus, we may restrict ourselves to 
x lying on 8;-1 and IIx - xoll? i W • But then, 
n (2w+l) 
IA+(p, x)1 - ~ r r CE, f¡(a, p, t)x¡p¡)2d7Jtp'dt 
... Jpl>O JO(t) i 
(A.13) 
(A.14) 
Hence, from the way e was rhosen, we have that IS(p,:r)l > A+(p,:c). Therefore, 
8(p,.r) - A(J1,:¡:) = S'(p,:r) - A+(p,.l:) - A-(p,x) 
< ,)'(p,x) - A+(p,:¡:) 
< o. 
and the proof is finished. 
'vVe start, now the prelimillaries to prove Pl'Oposition :1.:3. Let 
" { lRn  - .) 2} H" = = E : L.-]J¡:I:¡..J¡ = 0,=1- + ... + =" = 1 . 
i=1 
o 
(A.15) 
Recall that 1ro denotes the orthogonal projection frol1l lRn onto the plane {z : z·xo = O}. 
We have, 
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Lemma 2 Irz E Hp1 thf.l~ 1I11"0(z)1I ~ *. 
Proof of lemma 2: 
First, 1I"0(z) = = - (z' xu}xo, so 
00 the other hand, :: . Xo = cos(::, xo). Thus, the maximum of (z . XO)2 is attained 
when the angle between z and Xo is minimum, i.e. on the edges of the positive or-
thant. By symmetry we may assume that = = (O, ::'2, ••. , =11-1, JI - Li~} zl). A simple 
computation shows that = . ;z:o attains its maximum. fol' Z'2 == ... = Zn = ';:-1' So, 
and the Lemma follows. 
Proof of Proposition 3.3: 
'2 1 (= . :z:o) ~ 1 - -
11 
o 
By Lemma 3.2 it is enough to show that for each p E 'H., D F(p) is negative semidefinite 
on H(w). 5ince DF(p) is homogeneolls of degree -1 in p. it is enough to show this for 
p E 'H. n 5'+-1 . 
From now on, we fix p E 'H. n 5'+-1, consider, 
11 
S(p,;¡;} = L S'¡j(p)P¡I'.iXj;/:j 
i .. I=1 
11 
A(l',.r) = L A¡j(l')Pill j;/:¡;¡;j, 
¡,j=1 
where Sij(a,p,p' w(a)) éLre the entries of the Slutsky's matrix. 
As before \Ve let 
-\(0') = sUPPAO,]I) : p E 'H. n S~-I} < O, 
:11 
(A.16) 
(A.17) 
. • 'LJ n cn-l . L'k' 1 fi SlDce .H .:;1+ IS c()mpact. I 'eWIse, we (e he 
A = i A(a)dJL. 
Then by Lemma 2 aud Formula A.8 in the proof of Theorem 2.6, it follows that, for 
x E HT" 
. A S(p,x) ::; -. 
n 
Note also, that 
v = inf p' w = iuf IIwll cos(p,w) > O, 
pes~-l pes~-l 
because it follows from metonymy that w is in the interior of lR~. 
Let 
lA/V 
e = / / > 0, n/wh 
where for z E lRtl, IIzlh = Ek=l Izlk' The Proposition is a cOllsequellce of Claims 1, 2 
alld 3 below. 
Recall the definition of Hp in A.15, 
Claim 1 For rach;1: E HpI S(p,;l:) + A(p,;z:) < O. 
Let x E H-p, Y¡ = x¡p¡ aud define 
a(p) = p' w 2: v > O. 
From the remark befo re Claim 1 Wf':if't' that (t(p)S(I',x) < ~~. 
011 tbe otber halld, Wf' have thal, 
aj;· 
a(p)A(p,x) = a(¡J) 2: 1 (Wj - JJ ')t'y¡yjdJL 
i,j A (. . 
aJ 
- a(p) { < W - f,y >< ""';l,y > dJL lA. ut 
:J2 
= LWIe f <W-j,y><Pk~j,y;dll 
le JA ui 
_ oj 
= LWk fu f. <,<;-j,y><pk-:),y>dr¡sg(s)ds 
le JH+ JO(a) oi 
Note that 
iJj(a,p,p· ,'1) 8j(a,p,p· s) 
!l = Pk !lt ' U.<lk u 
so we can write the Iast term as 
which is the same as 
1 iJ 2:WIc( [n [ Yk < ,'1 - j,y > dr¡sg(,c¡)ds - -2 [u f !l < s - j,y >2 dr¡sg(s)ds). 
Ic JR+ JG(s) JR+ JG(B) USk 
But the first term vallishes because 
L ':;;leYk = W • y = 0, 
le 
sillce x E Hp• Using now metollymy (Lnd iutegratioll by parts, we get 
Á l a ( ) :2 ) Á 1 2 8g(s) ~ < s - j ,y > (lr¡sg(·~ (ls = - < (s - J),y > dr¡s-8-ds, R+ G(s) uSIe R+ G(s) Sic 
and, as before, we have to worry onIy about the regions Bt = {,c¡ E R+ : 8:1:) > O}. 
Define, 
We first bound the illuer integrando Note that 
- (L SjPj:Cj - 2: jj( a, p, P . s )pjXj)2 
j j 
" :2" :2 < (L..,-SjPjXj) +(L..,!i(o,p,p·S)PjXj) 
J J 
J ) 
(A.IB) 
he.cause o ~ xf ~ 1. a11(1 p . f( a; p, 1) • .c;) = p . .... Since we are assuming, p E 5+-1, we 
have that p. s ~ IIsll. Thus, 
(A.19) 
A+(p,x) < é ¿Wk 
k 
- éllwlj¡ 
< 
1,\lv 
n 
< la(]J )S(p, x) I (A.20) 
It follows tbat a(p)(S(p,;z:) + A(p,x)) < O. Hellce S(p,x) + A(p,x) < O as advertised. 
Claim 2 For all x E R" such that L¡P¡X¡W¡ = O,Ulf. havf. that S(p,x) + A(p, x) < O. 
Let x E R" such that L¡P¡X¡W¡ = O. Let :; = 1I~lIx E Hv. Thell from Claim 1, we have 
that S(p,x) + A(p,x) = IIxIl2(S(1',z) + A(1),Z)) < O. 
Let us define now the following quantitit.>.s, 
n 
.~(J>, y) = L S¡j(p )Y¡Yj 
¡,j=l 
(A.21 ) 
and 
n 
A(p,y) - L A¡j{p)Y¡Yj, 
i,i=l 
where S¡j(p) and A¡j(p) are defined,respedively, by equations A.16 and A.li. We have 
the following 
:14 
· Claim 3 For all y E JR;¡ s'Uch that L¡ y¡W¡ ~ 0, wc ha ve that .S'{p" y) + '.A(p, y) < O. 
Let y E 1Rn such that L¡ y¡W¡ = O. Let X¡ = y¡fP¡. Then 
L p¡x¡W¡ = L y¡Wi = O, 
, , 
t I 
and, by Claim 2, 
O> S(p,x) + A(p,x) = .S'(y) + A(y) 
which finishes the. proof of the theol'em. o 
Proof of Theorem 3.7: 
It is a standard resuJt (see [:3]), that if Z(p) is continuous, bounded below, and 
satisfies Walras' law and property (iv), then there is p* E 1R~+ su eh that Z(p*) = O. 
Next, we note that, by (iv), there is 6 > O sueh that if d(p, aR~+} ~ 6, then 
Z(p) # O. Let 1í be a dosed cone, such that if p E R~+ \ 1í, then d(p, aR~+) ~ 6. In 
particular, the set of equilibrium prices is contained in 1í. 
It follows from Proposition :3.:1. that thel'f" is é, such that if for k = 1, ... , n 
then the excess demand fundion satisfies, 
(p - q)' (Z(p) - Z(q)) < O 
for all prices p '# q E 1í with p . W = q . W. 
Fix éLll equiJibl'iulll price ¡/" E 1í, and Jet lJ E 1í, not collinear with p*. Let 
A = ,,~.~ > O. Then Ap" # q and 
-Ap· . Z(q) = (Ap* - tI) • (Z(Ap*) - Z(q)) < 0, 
since Z(AP*) = Z(¡n = o, q' Z(q) = o éLlld lhe. re.stricted 1l10110tQIÜcity" property of 
. .. . 
Propositioll 3.3. 
This implies that ]1* • Z (q) > O for any other q E 'H, llot collinear with p*. In 
particular, Z ( q) =f O for any other q E 'H, not collillear wi th ]J". Therefore, p* is the 
only possible equilibrium price in 'H and hence in 1R~+. o 
:J6 
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